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ABSTRACT 
What are the impacts of airstrikes on civilian sentiment and political violence? 
With increased air campaigns and technology proliferation in the Middle East and Africa, 
there exists a significant gap exploring airstrike associations within irregular warfare. In 
response, this thesis uses new geospatial measurements to map civilian sentiment in 
Yemen. Then, spatiotemporal windows are utilized to assess associations between 
airstrikes, sentiments, and political violence. The findings imply that airstrikes are 
associated with an increase in extreme sentiment—for both states, and for insurgencies—
suggesting that airstrike effects mobilize bystanders to participate in the political process. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that airstrikes raise the level of post-strike political 
violence in Yemen and Pakistan, but may decrease post-strike political violence in 
Afghanistan and Somalia. This gives credence to the theory that narrative distribution 
may be a critical link that connects secondary airstrike effects with policy goals within 
the human domain. In addition, information asymmetry between competing narrative 
campaigns and civilians may be a viable theory to connect extreme sentiment and 
political violence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
Since the turn of the century, the use of aircraft in irregular warfare has evolved in 
both complexity and importance. Multiple contributing factors increase this trend’s 
importance including airpower derived human rights violations, deception campaigns, 
and third-party influences. Although these factors are not novel, upsurges in technology 
proliferation have lowered the entry cost for using aircraft at war and increased the 
salience of airpower debates.1 Air warfare is no longer conducted only on the sanitized 
battlegrounds of Apulia, or the bi-state skies above Kursk.2 The air battle is now over the 
preverbal urban landscape, where disparate actors—and a multitude of motives—battle 
among a civilian populous. Using the Middle East as just one example, Russian and 
Syrian air forces are bombing civilians to quell a rebellion; the Islamic State, a quasi-
governmental insurgency is launching drones against coalition forces; and 12 allied air 
forces are attempting to employ airpower among a continually growing civilian air fleet.3 
The impact of competing goals and alliances inhibits the ability for a no-fly zone and 
forces civil, military, and insurgent aircraft to operate in the same sky.4 As a result, the 
complexity of irregular warfare—often wholly navigated by ground forces—has 
extended to forces in the air.5 However, despite the growing complexity and importance 
of airpower in irregular warfare, academic studies have been slow to respond, resulting in 
only a few dedicated yet conflicting empirical studies. 
                                                 
1 Patrick Tucker, “ISIS Has a Drone Strategy Too,” The Atlantic, October 18, 2016, http://www.the 
atlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/anti-drone/504479/. 
2 Both the battle of Cannae and the battle of Kursk were conventional force on force engagements. 
Both are used as historical case studies for traditional warfare, and notably, both battles are void of the 
influence of civilian populations on the battlefield.  
3 “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists,” October 12, 2016, http:// 
www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve; “ISIS Now Weaponizing Drones in 
Syria,” October 12, 2016, http://nypost.com/2016/10/12/isis-now-weaponizing-drones-in-syria/. 
4 Kristina Wong, “Petraeus: “‘It’s Not Too Late’ for a No-Fly Zone in Syria,” The Hill, September 29, 
2016, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/298641-petraeus-its-not-too-late-for-a-no-fly-zone-in-syria. 
5 For an excellent primer on the growing complexity of irregular warfare, read Frank G. Hoffman, 
“Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs,” Orbis 50, no. 3 (2006): 395–411, 
doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2006.04.002. 
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In addition, states are increasingly turning to aircraft to coerce civilian 
populations through airpower, as depicted in the Syrian government’s bombing of 
hospitals and United Nations (UN) convoys.6 These horrific campaigns against civilians, 
compounded by Syria’s use of chemical weapons, such as mustard gas, are raising 
debates over U.S. intervention.7 However, diplomatic attempts to influence norms 
concerning the use of aircraft in irregular warfare have not resulted in beneficial change.8 
Compounding these issues, U.S. attempts at using influence operations to spur civilian 
buy-in have been met with Russian counter-influence. For example, when the United 
States claimed to have killed the top ISIS spokesman; soon after, Russia claimed to have 
eliminated the same individual.9 Although it might be possible to achieve coercive aims 
without changing sentiment, U.S. campaigns have rarely resorted to such indiscriminant 
violence.10 Ultimately, the assumption that airpower can affect public sentiment has not 
yet been corroborated by statistical analysis.  
Heuristic studies attempting to explain airpower effects often assume a correlation 
between airstrikes and negative sentiment toward a local state, especially when civilian 
                                                 
6 Roy Gutman, “Assad and Putin’s Sick Strategy Bombing Hospitals,” The Daily Beast, July 27, 2016, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/27/assad-and-putin-s-sick-strategy-bombing-hospitals.html; 
Erin Cunningham, Karen DeYoung, and Andrew Roth, “U.N. Suspends Aid Convoys in Syria after Deadly 
Attack on Relief Shipment,” Washington Post, September 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/end-of-syria-cease-fire-marked-by-new-offensive-and-bombing-of-aid-convoy/2016/09/20/92ae 
ad0c-7eb7-11e6-ad0e-ab0d12c779b1_story.html. 
7 Krishnadev Calamur, “The Letter Urging a U.S. Rethink on Syria,” The Atlantic, June 17, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/state-department-syria-letter/487511/. 
8 Somini Sengupta, Michael R. Gordon, and Anne Barnard, “John Kerry Urges Grounding of Military 
Aircraft in ‘Key Areas’ of Syria,” New York Times, September 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/ 
22/world/middleeast/john-kerry-syria.html. 
9 Merieme Arif, Holly Yan, and Jim Sciutto, “U.S. Doubts Russia’s Claim It Killed ISIS Spokesman,” 
CNN, August 31, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/middleeast/isis-leader-killed/index.html. 
10 For an example of studies into indiscriminate violence, reference J. Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate 
Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 
(June 1, 2009): 331–62, doi: 10.1177/0022002708330881. 
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casualties are reported.11 However, given the proliferation of unmanned and aerial 
technologies, it is difficult for the civilian population to identify precisely the actor using 
military aircraft.12 As demand for sales of both unmanned and manned aircraft grows 
incrementally, so too does the multitude of new and revived air forces.13 With the 
increase in global air forces comes a corresponding increase in diametrically different 
opinions on the strategy and use of bombs. Whereas civilian populations may have 
understood the actor and cause of bombing campaigns in the past, anticipation of 
targeting techniques is no longer viable due to the great expanse of actors and causes. For 
example, a Houthi rebel takeover of a Yemen government airfield led to the involvement 
of multiple air forces from the United Arab Emirates, United States, and Saudi Arabia.14 
Houthi rebels were subsequently able to co-opt a portion of the government pilots to fly 
rebel-bombing missions.15 With the total number of dissimilar air forces in the country 
rising to five, sentiment in response to airstrikes has been more complex than a simple 
negative correlation for the state. To date, too little is known about airstrikes and public 
sentiment and too few studies have systematically examined possible associations. 
Therefore, empirical studies on the spread of sentiment for state and non-state actors—
                                                 
11 Andrew Terrill, “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs—ProQuest,” 
Parameters 42/43.4/1 (Winter 2012/2013): 17–23, http://search.proquest.com/openview/5070543c08d40d 
570f5e208b56cf304f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar; Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, U.S. Airstrikes Breed 
Anger, and Sympathy for Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, May 29, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUm 
KI0U_story.html; Koen Stroeken, War, Technology, Anthropology (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 
21. 
12 Yara Bishara and Megan Specia, “The Anatomy of an Airstrike,” New York Times, September 28, 
2016, http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000004676894/the-anatomy-of-an-airstrike. 
html. 
13 Courtney Howard, “Global Military Aircraft Market to Grow from $61 Billion to $87 Billion,” 
Intelligent Aerospace, April 9, 2015, http://www.intelligent-aerospace.com/articles/2015/04/global-
military-aircraft-market-to-grow-from-61-billion-to-87-billion.html; “Global Military Drones Market 
Shares, Strategies, and Forecasts 2016–2022—Research and Markets,” August 17, 2016, http://www.pr 
newswire.com/news-releases/global-military-drones-market-shares-strategies-and-forecasts-2016-2022---
research-and-markets-300314730.html. 
14 Jethro Mullen, “Why Is Saudi Arabia Bombing Yemen?,” CNN, March 26, 2015, http://www.cnn. 
com/2015/03/26/middleeast/yemen-saudi-arabia-offensive-why-now/index.html; Thomas Gibbons-Neff 
and Missy Ryan, “U.S. Special Operations Force Extends Yemen Mission against Al-Qaeda,” Washington 
Post, June 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/17/u-s-special-
operations-forces-shift-to-long-term-mission-in-yemen/. 
15 Farea Al-Muslimi, “Yemen Air Force Falls into Grip of Houthis,” Al-Monitor, April 29, 2015, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/yemen-houthis-air-force-al-Qaeda-advance.html. 
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within this unique irregular warfare context—are necessary to sharpen the debate on 
associations of positive or negative sentiment after airstrikes.  
Irregular warfare is often referred to as a fight for influence over a population.16 If 
sentiment were indeed impacted by airstrikes, then hypothetically a correlation between 
civilian sentiment and the organizational goals of an insurgency would exist. Some 
dedicated empirical studies do exist on airpower effects vis-à-vis insurgent goals focusing 
on positive or negative correlations with political violence, as measured by individual 
violent events conducted by a political organization.17 However, other metrics, such as 
insurgent size and finance levels, would be potentially stronger measurements of 
effectiveness. Unfortunately, a gap exists concerning available quantitative datasets to 
measure finance and insurgent troop size. Even so, this thesis theorizes that insurgents 
conduct information operations to enhance their organizational goals. For example, 
insurgent desires to manipulate public opinion have led to near-real time distortions of 
airpower effects, particularly for U.S. operations. This impact is so profound that security 
studies experts Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker observe insurgents have leveled the playing 
field with their exploitation of information technology using mass media.18  
As has been the case in segments of Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, 
airpower is often used in austere locales where insurgent groups have monopolies on 
information. These monopolies allow insurgents to falsely inflate civilian casualties 
directly and build support for their narratives.19 Moreover, insurgent effectiveness at 
managing technological innovations ensure that even in populated areas, insurgents are 
                                                 
16 “Annex 3-2 Irregular Warfare,” 5–6, July 12, 2016, https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmirregularwar 
fare.htm. 
17 Jason Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Coercion in Counterinsurgency 
Wars” (unpublished, Yale University, April 6, 2014), 16–18; Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, 
“The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly, January 4, 
2016, 6, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqv004. 
18 Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2009), 2. 
19 “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” November 30, 2001, https:// 
www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/. 
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often more adept than the United States at building narratives in response to airstrikes.20 
These examples show a concerted effort by insurgents to control information regarding 
airstrikes and raise the importance of a statistical study. Therefore, a quantitative analysis 
is necessary to determine the interplay among airpower, sentiment, and insurgent 
effectiveness as measured by political violence.  
1. Purpose and Scope 
This thesis takes up the challenge of measuring the effects of airstrikes on public 
sentiment and political violence. More specifically, this thesis first measures associations 
between airpower and the spread of sentiment in Yemen in 2014. Then, it provides 
further clarity on the relationship between airpower and the spread of violence by 
conducting a statistical study of airstrikes across multiple countries between 2002 and 
2016. Statistical models used to examine the impact of airstrikes and political violence 
cover Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Ultimately, this study aims to enhance 
policy and planning within the complex battlespace of irregular warfare when using 
airpower.  
Attempts at correlating airpower, sentiment, and political violence are subject to 
the following assumptions and limitations. First, previous studies have lost academic 
impact due to their lack of replicability. Replication issues exist for various reasons 
including the close hold of classified information and the academic’s choice to use non-
open source replication files.21 Therefore, this study uses open-source media reports of 
airstrikes and replicable code to ensure transparency and replicability. However, when 
using open-source media reporting of airstrikes, these sources may contain an inherent 
selection bias and the potential for false claims. In response, this thesis uses statistical 
regressions as a baseline to help offset any systemic errors that exist, as well as any 
individual reporting errors. In addition, this thesis cross-references two openly available 
                                                 
20 To explore thoughts on the failure of U.S. narratives, read Amy Zalman and Jonathan Clarke, “The 
Global War on Terror: A Narrative in Need of a Rewrite,” Ethics & International Affairs 23, no. 2 (June 1, 
2009): 101–13, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2009.00201.x. 
21 A third reason for the lack of replicability could be that the author is intending to publish the 
findings in a book, and as such, must keep files on hold until publication. Reference the website www. 
jasonlyall.com for Lyall, “Bombing to Lose?.” 
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datasets to create a new and highly detailed database of airstrikes, using the same analytic 
methodology to assess political violence across four separate countries. 
2. Research Questions 
This thesis posits that irregular warfare—heavily influenced by the human 
domain—will experience distinct effects in regions with higher levels of airstrikes. 
Therefore, regarding airpower’s role in irregular warfare and the corresponding public 
sentiment, this thesis attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. To what extent does airpower affect popular sentiment and political 
violence in irregular warfare? 
2. To what extent do the effects of airstrikes on political violence differ 
across campaigns?  
3. To what extent do airstrikes increase or decrease the level of local support 
for insurgent organizations or the existing state? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Historical Synopsis 
The first combat use of airpower is said to be by Italian Captain Carlo Piazza who 
flew reconnaissance missions in Libya on October 23, 1911.22 Warfighting airpower was 
born inherently irregular, as it was the first of its kind. Its irregular use was highlighted 
by the Italian innovation of leaflet drops, aerial reconnaissance, radio communications, 
and night bombings.23 From the onset, irregular warfare commanders, such as T. E. 
Lawrence, used the new technology for supporting armored cars and for inserting 
agents.24 Conventional airpower theorists, such as Gulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and 
Hugh Trenchard, supported airpower’s use for control of civilian populations. These 
initial zealots postulated that the people’s will could be dominated by the destruction of 
                                                 
22 John O’Connell, The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20th Century: Part One (New York: 
iUniverse, Inc., 2007), 1. 
23 Steven J. Ayre and Jeremy F. Hough, “Air Power in Irregular Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012), 8. 
24 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World, 56635th ed. (Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 170–177. 
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civilian centers or factories.25 However, even at this early point in airpower history, an 
ideological rift on bombing—or kinetic events—began to develop. More specifically, 
some believed in the power of bombing events alone to control populations; others 
believed air delivered effects, to include bombing, are only as useful as the narrative it 
supported. 
Irregular airpower proponents in Germany, the United States, and Great Britain 
grew in both frequency and scope during World War II. Germany in several irregular 
airpower firsts used dirigibles to dominate a population center from the air instead of 
bombing it directly.26 In addition, Germany integrated parachutes and gliders into its 
army-airpower to insert elite troops behind enemy lines.27 Meanwhile, the United States 
built civilian volunteer air forces in China prior to entering the war, thus slowing the 
Japanese invasion. The U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) used airpower to infiltrate 
agents behind German lines for sabotage and intelligence gathering. At the same time, the 
OSS made its first strides with air-centric proxy companies launching covert missions 
behind Japanese lines.28 U.S. airpower continued to advance as Jimmy Doolittle 
showcased the first successful air-centric special operation by successfully bombing the 
Japanese mainland, critically bolstering U.S. morale. The British, courtesy of Orde 
Windgate, built a successful surrogate air force in Burma to deliver the Chindits, which 
developed a deep strike capability for invading behind enemy lines.29 Even so, the 
theoretical framework for irregular airpower in the 21st century, along with most of the 
Allied capabilities, was disbanded upon the cessation of the war. The result was a neglect 
of irregular airpower study while strategic bombing theory was widely promulgated.  
                                                 
25 Giulio Douhet and Charles A. Gabriel, Command of the Air (London: Books Express Publishing, 
2013), viii–10. 
26 Basil Clarke and Charles Emery Rosendahl, The History of Airships (Whitefish, MT: Literary 
Licensing, 2012), 94. 
27 William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(Presidio, CA: Novato, 1995), 33. 
28 Royal Leonard, I Flew for China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Dorian and Company, Inc., 1942), 
211–236; Robert Lee Scott, Flying Tiger: Chennault of China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), 21–
26. 
29 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 185–187. 
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Conflicts in Korea and Vietnam saw a development of airpower in irregular 
warfare for the British and French, but showed regression for the United States.30 The 
new United States Air Force (USAF), the main proponent of strategic bombing, 
exchanged irregular capabilities for nuclear armament and “higher and faster” jets.31 In 
this way, the USAF severed interactions with the human domain and focused completely 
on the attrition of the military, deviating from irregular warfare goals. The British, in 
contrast, began to recognize and document the limitations of munitions in rural 
campaigns and new technologies in irregular war.32 Highly customizable aircraft 
packages and integration with SOF brought the Mau Mau to their knees and ensured 
success in Oman.33 For their part, the French also continued their development by 
building irregular airpower specialization and maintaining an arsenal of purposefully 
simple, yet effective, aircraft.34 Ultimately, the United States refined its ability to strike 
with precision and destroy adversary aircraft, enabling tactical conventional goals, but 
failing to increase irregular warfare proficiency.  
From 1975 to the end of the century, airpower failures in irregular war were 
common. In 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, the attempted hostage rescue in Iran, failed in 
part due to an aircraft collision on a remote runway. Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) 
in Afghanistan was thwarted by the destruction of their helicopters by the Mujahedeen 
armed with anti-aircraft missiles. In 1993, humanitarian and protection operations in 
Mogadishu were disrupted after the loss of 18 U.S. soldiers and two Blackhawk 
helicopters shot down by militia-men firing anti-tank rockets. These failures showcased 
the rift that had developed between human domain–centric warfare and airpower 
                                                 
30 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, 1st ed. 
(Lincoln: Bison Books, 2006), 117–146; Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s 
Mission to Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 366–374; Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 258–275. 
31 Warren A. Trest, Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America’s Secret Air Wars 
(Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2000), 3–5. 
32 Bruce Hoffman, British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919–1976 (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1989), 104–117.  
33 Michael Ashcroft, Special Forces Heroes (London: Headline, 2012), Chapter 4; Jeremy Black, Air 
Power: A Global History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 177. 
34 Mark A. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), 7–11. 
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technologies. More specifically, enhancements in targeting capabilities did not correlate 
to increases in irregular warfare success when humans were able to exploit kinetic 
destruction. Whereas the Army developed special operations programs to deal with the 
human-domain—such as civil affairs, psychological operations, and information 
operations—the Air Force largely failed to nurture these skillsets.35  
Since the turn of the century, various new roles for airpower have been tested. In 
Afghanistan, a Department of Defense-Central Intelligence Agency (DOD-CIA) airpower 
campaign succeeded momentarily in 2001 but lost momentum by 2013. Israel conducted 
a limited war in 2006, which began as an isolated airpower campaign; however, failures 
to stop Hezbollah guerrilla tactics quickly led to augmentation by ground forces. North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) 2011 air-centric campaign in Libyan overthrew 
a dictator but failed to secure lasting peace.36 Subsequently, in Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia, the United States began new campaigns reminiscent of the British in Dhofar 
and the early years of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.37 Airpower and special 
operations forces (SOF) were requested once again to navigate the complex situations 
where adversary nation-state and sub-state entities intermingle to attempt to control the 
populous. Even so, academic studies have yet to uncover governing principles for human 
domain interactions with airpower. 
 
                                                 
35 The Air Force does have a military information support operations Air Force specialty code; 
however, they are not inherently organized within special operations (SOF) to deal specifically with the 
human-domain in irregular warfare. In 1980, the U.S. Air Force did create a psychological operations 
capability in the EC-130 Commando Solo. However, at the time of this writing, active duty EC-130s no 
longer exist, and the Guard EC-130s have been reduced to three total. Therefore, the Air Force contains an 
operational level program but lacks tactical level execution ability and guidance. “EC-130J Commando 
Solo,” January 14, 2016, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104535/ec-130j-
commando-solo.aspx. 
36 Robert H. Gregory, Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars: Air Power in Kosovo and Libya (Lincoln, NE: 
Potomac Books, 2015), 207–217. 
37 “Special Operations, Intelligence, and Airpower: A Lethal Triumvirate,” September 25, 2015, 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/special-operations-intelligence-and-airpower-a-lethal-triumvirate/. 
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2. The Debate over Airpower 
Three primary aspects fuel current debates over the use of airpower in irregular 
warfare. First, the choice to use airpower either exclusively or in partnership with SOF in 
the Middle East and Africa deviates from large-scale, land-based warfare tactics by the 
United States.38 U.S. defense leaders have scrutinized these tactics primarily because of a 
lack of measurable progress and an increase in perceived retaliatory terrorist attacks.39 
For example, the offender who conducted the Orlando shooting in June 2016 cited 
Pakistan drone strikes as the rationale behind the murders.40 This explanation highlights 
an example of attempted manipulation of kinetic effects from air strikes. Second, foreign 
policy in locations, such as Syria and Libya, are becoming increasingly complex with 
both local and external air forces.41 These situations demonstrate the complexity of 
airpower’s effects when targeting options become policy-level discussions. Recent 
examples include U.S. Department of State pressure on the White House to modify its 
strategic goals against the Islamic State and directly target the Assad regime.42 Finally, 
large-scale civilian casualties, such as those in the Gunship destruction of the Kunduz 
hospital, or the Syrian targeting of the Aleppo hospital, have concerned citizens and 
military alike over a lack of retribution when using airstrikes.43  
                                                 
38 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). 
39 Leigh Ann Caldwell, “John McCain Says Obama’s Policies ‘Directly Responsible’ for Orlando,” 
NBC News, June 17, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com /politics/congress/john-mccain-says-obama-s-polic 
ies-directly-responsible-orlando-n593951. 
40 “President Obama on the Tragic Shooting in Orlando,” June 16, 2016, https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/blog/2016/06/12/president-obama-tragic-shooting-orlando; Bill Gertz, “Orlando Terror Attack 
‘Triggered’ by Pentagon Drone Strike,” Washington Free Beacon, September 28, 2016, http://freebeacon. 
com/national-security/orlando-terror-attack-triggered-pentagon-drone-strike/. 
41 For a good view of the complexity of the Syrian situation, reference the CNN reporting diagram on 
the Syrian conflicts multiple players in the article from Joe Sterling, Angela Dewan, and Joshua Berlinger, 
“UN Chief Calls Convoy Attackers in Syria ‘Cowards,’” CNN, September 20, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/09/19/middleeast/syria-aid-convoys-attacked/index.html. 
42 Calamur, “The Letter Urging a U.S. Rethink on Syria”; David E. Sanger, Mazzetti Mark, and Ben 
Hubbard, “How a U.S. Airstrike Missed ISIS, but Damaged U.S. Policy in Syria,” New York Times, 
September 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/world/middleeast/us-bombing-syria.html. 
43 “Pentagon Announces Punishments in Deadly Hospital Attack,” accessed September 20, 2016, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pentagon-punishment-afghanistan-hospital-attack-kunduz/; Gutman, 
“Assad and Putin’s Sick Strategy Bombing Hospitals.” 
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Within all airpower debates, the asymmetric and destructive capacity of airpower 
is well known. However, constraints exist—at least in part—because of the lack of 
knowledge on secondary impacts and effects.44 More specifically, the follow-on effects 
of kinetic destruction by aircraft are not well understood and lead to confused and stalled 
decision making. Recent examples can be seen in the U.S. hesitancy to target 
internationally condemned actions being conducted by Syria, Iran, and Russia. These 
situations highlight an inherent bias that kinetic destruction cannot be isolated from 
violent repercussions. Instead, the fear that public sentiment may reduce legitimacy in the 
government and destabilize corporate sectors with follow-on political violence is a 
constant Damoclean dagger. Further studies or examinations of airstrike repercussion on 
civilians must uncover the truth behind the bias and assist policy makers in deciding 
when to restrain or release airpower.  
3. Theoretical Literature 
Winston Churchill famously claimed, “Air power is the most difficult of all forms 
of military force to measure, or even express in precise terms.”45 This inherent limitation 
exists in part because of airpower’s asymmetric nature and in part because of its 
continued technological innovations. However, relevant literature dedicated to airpower 
in irregular warfare can be separated into two major categories, conflicting theoretical 
literature, and academic discourse on the use of kinetic events. More specifically, 
conflicting ideas exist on both the use of airpower and the study of how effective 
airpower has been.  
In response to the many dimensions of airpower, classical theory has been 
dominated by Jominian principles that espouse empirically based attrition and its 
                                                 
44 “Then what?” was coined by former CIA Director Petreaus who gave an in-depth discussion on why 
hesitancy exists within the White House to allow USAF targeting of Syria, Russia, and Iran. As seen in 
Wong, “Petraeus: ‘It’s Not Too Late’ for a No-Fly Zone in Syria.” 
45 Quoted in Andrew G. B. Vallance, “‘The Conceptual Structure of Air Power,’” in Air Power: 
Collected Essays on Doctrine (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1990), 1. 
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cascading effects.46 In this vein, Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell 
developed the first airpower theories of dominant force to enable destruction of carefully 
chosen vital points. Airpower within classical theory is singularly sufficient at war. Small 
differences accentuate classical theorists, as Douhet postulates that bombing urban 
centers is effective at controlling the will of the populous while Trenchard and Mitchell 
support bombing factories to build worker trepidation and to crumble the war-making 
machine. However, these theories ran into issues during World War II when it was 
observed that the destruction of civilians or their workplaces did not induce fear as 
hypothesized.47 In response, subsequent airpower theorists, such as Worden, moved 
strategic bombing away from attempts to affect the human-domain. Instead, Warden 
hypothesized that the vital center is not just the civilian populous but five concentric 
rings, starting with the leadership, and ending with the fielded military.  
Additional airpower theories continued the theoretical divide from human-centric 
and information-centric warfare. Coercive airpower, in an attempt to move away from 
cascading effects, oversimplified a state’s choices to either bombing the military or 
bombing civilians. Coercive airpower theory then suggests that airpower is best 
employed to limit the ability of adversaries to accomplish their political goals by using 
the military.48 The main proponents of coercive airpower theory include Robert Pape, as 
well as Byman, Waxman, and Larsen.49 In short, between two competing political forces, 
coercive airpower theorizes that kinetic punishment or leadership decapitation is not a 
viable solution for strategic success in a campaign.50 Unfortunately, coercive airpower 
                                                 
46 Jomini was the premiere example of enlightenment military thought. Although he did not wholly 
agree to geometric or mathematic warfare, he purposed all strategic warfare could be distilled to principles 
that were independent of times, place, and the nature of arms. In this way, he focused on the destruction of 
the enemy’s military force through control of centers of gravity in a relatively closed system. Azar Gat, A 
History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, 1st ed. (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 108–137. 
47 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 1st ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 52. 
48 Keith Brent, “Proceedings of the 2012 RAAF Air Power Conference: Air Power & Coercive 
Diplomacy,” RAAF Air Power Conference, Australia: RAAF Air Power Development Centre, 2013, 81–
89. 
49 Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Pape, Bombing to Win.  
50 Pape, Bombing to Win, 316–317. 
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oversimplifies the debate by suggesting that bombing civilians and bombing insurgent 
leadership are equivalent. In addition, it supposes that the only rational for selective 
targeting is leadership decapitation to punish an adversary. However, recent historical 
examples have clearly shown that a social network attack can directly bomb insurgents to 
dismantle a network, and not punish. Even so, the two most prominent theories for the 
use of airpower distance themselves from human-domain and information-domain 
concepts.  
Issues immediately arise when attempting to marry strategic bombing or coercive 
bombing theories with irregular warfare goals. Based on Warden’s writings, current 
airpower guidance—even for irregular warfare—advocates for overwhelming force on as 
many vital centers as possible to provide the cascading effects.51 However, the human 
centricity of irregular warfare, and the need to influence the populous, negates a clearly 
definable vital center. In addition, cascading effects, when in an information dominant 
atmosphere are subject to bias and interpretation; effects that could equally cascade into 
mobilization for or against state forces. Insurgents, in contrast, often use non-military 
means, such as information to accomplish their goals.52 Therefore, among attrition- and 
coercion-based airpower theories, a gap exists in academic discourse on irregular 
warfare. To illustrate, academics, such as Colin Grey, who highlight the importance of 
strategic bombing, purposefully downplay the role of irregular warfare.53 Other scholars, 
such as Robert Gregory, Jr. and Robert Pape, have included irregular wars in their 
academic studies but have made little differentiation between the irregular and 
conventional applications of airpower.54  
                                                 
51 Jason B. Barlow, Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the Present (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 26–27. 
52 Rid and Hecker, War 2.0. 
53 Colin Grey is a proponent of strategic bombing, which led him to the conclusion that because 
airpower had never been as tactically proficient as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the failure in the years post-
2003 only existed because airpower was being asked to partake in a campaign it was not designed for with 
a lack of operational guidance. As such, airpower can take little blame for the results of an irregular 
campaign. Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 238–246; Trest, Air Commando One, 11–15. 
54 Pape, Bombing to Win, 52; Gregory, Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars, 4–15. 
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4. Relevant Empirical Literature 
A small body of empirical analysis exists by Jason Lyall, Patrick Johnston, and 
Anoop Sarbahi that focuses primarily on retaliatory terrorism to airstrikes.55 However, 
these empirical studies are contradictory, one claiming kinetic strikes have increased 
retaliatory violence in Afghanistan, and the other claiming kinetic strikes have decreased 
retaliatory violence in Pakistan. These discrepancies leave a gap in academic studies, but 
could exist due to data or methodology differences. In addition, discrepancies could exist 
due to both the type and motif of airpower use. For example, airpower was most 
commonly used in Afghanistan in a reactive role, reactively supporting Army troops who 
could not defend with organic support. Pakistan, in contrast, used selective targeting 
without large-scale ground troop support.  
Regrettably, in attempting to distill measurable variables, scholars within the 
aforementioned camp overly simplify the effects of airpower to increases or decreases in 
insurgent violence. Measuring insurgent violence in isolation can bring about causal 
fallacies, primarily in irregular warfare campaigns wherein airpower exists in response to 
violence, not as a precursor to it. In contrast, researchers, such as Janos Radvani, have 
shown that violence is only one of several conditions for insurgent effectiveness.56 
Therefore, without a theoretical and tactical understanding of airpower use, many 
scholars have fallen prey to reverse causation.  
It should be noted that a statistical study into the use of indiscriminant violence in 
irregular—or population centric—warfare does exist. On one hand, the use of 
indiscriminant violence has been correlated to a decrease in political violence.57 On the 
other, indiscriminant violence has been associated with alienating the civilian 
population.58 These civilians are repressed from violence only until they find an 
                                                 
55 Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Coercion in Counterinsurgency Wars”; 
Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan.” 
56 Janos Radvanyi suggests that spectacular events of violence will increase as an insurgency is 
building up and also dying. Janos Radvanyi, Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term 
Strategic Planning (New York: Praeger, 1990), 130. 
57 Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?,” 349–350. 
58 Sebastian Schutte, “Violence and Civilian Loyalties Evidence from Afghanistan,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, January 22, 2016, 0022002715626249, doi: 10.1177/0022002715626249. 
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appropriate avenue to vent their frustrations. Even so, indiscriminant violence is a 
separate avenue of study, distinct from this thesis looking to understand kinetic strikes in 
a politically constrained, or limited, environment.  
Consolidating the review, U.S. airpower has slowly moved from state and 
situation appropriate technology, to the broad-brush application of higher, faster, and 
more accurate aircraft. These aircraft are focused on the destruction of military targets 
through the use of attrition-based or coercive-based theories. Both major theories fail to 
address the human-domain or information-domain necessities of irregular warfare 
adequately. This failure exists, at least in part, because of the lack of empirical analysis 
on variables outside of direct kinetic destruction. The small amount of analysis that has 
been conducted exists only to test airpower effects to increase retaliatory violence. 
Violence, used in isolation, is too shallow a variable to encapsulate the prescribed 
application of airpower in irregular warfare. Nonetheless, the debate on airpower is 
consistently increasing, creating an academic gap and a policy need to discuss the 
interplay between bombs, public sentiment, and political violence.  
C. OVERALL THESIS APPROACH  
This thesis uses two studies to determine the level of correlation between 
airstrikes and sentiment, and airstrikes and political violence. The units of analysis for 
this thesis are individual geospatial events recorded each day from January 2002 to 
July 2016. Both studies use advanced statistical regression techniques to assess the 
relationships between civil conflict, as measured using Uppsalla University’s geo-
referenced event dataset, and public sentiment, as measured using the report from Yemen 
program support research. Political violence was recorded per individual event where an 
attack occurred between a politically motivated group and a state. Importantly, actions 
from political groups are recorded in the dataset only when the overall threshold of 
25 battle-related deaths per year is reached.59 Air effects are recorded per event that 
contains at least two reputable media sources reporting the strike.  
                                                 
59 Mihai Croicu and Ralph Sundberg, UCDP GED Codebook Version 2.0 (Sweden: Department of 
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2015). 
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When assessing sentiment, this thesis tests the ability of airstrikes to have an 
enduring temporal effect. Temporal effects are measured by aggregations of airstrikes in 
various timeframes including days, months, and years prior to the examination, such as 
the nationwide survey in Yemen. In addition, sentiment changes are measured against 
regions with higher levels of airstrikes between two separate survey time periods to infer 
causal direction. For civil conflict, airstrikes are measured against a spatiotemporal 
window 90 days prior to the event to control for existing levels of violence, geography, 
economic status, and power relations. Afterwards, political violence trends in the 
surrounding area are measured to suggest associations between airstrikes and violence.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis progresses with the following chapters. Chapter II assess associations 
between airstrikes and sentiment that lays the foundation between objective kinetic 
destruction and subjective human-domain issues. Chapter III measures associations 
between airstrikes and political violence, both within and across campaigns. In turn, this 
measurement ensures that connectivity between sentiment and political violence is 
explored. Each statistical study introduces the issue at hand, the current discussion, 
relevant literature, methodology, and results. Finally, Chapter IV contains conclusions, 
theory development, and recommendations.  
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II. AIRSTRIKES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
We are confident that the removal from the terrorist network of this 
experienced al-Shabaab commander … will disrupt near-term attack[s] 
—Peter Cook60 
Pentagon press secretary on airstrikes in Somalia, June 1, 2016 
 
To what extent do airstrikes in irregular warfare effect levels of political violence? 
More specifically, do locations directly surrounding an airstrike result in higher levels of 
subsequent political violence? This chapter traces individually recorded attacks as 
measured by Uppsala University’s georeferenced dataset on violent events, namely, 
politically motivated attacks by groups that have caused at least 25 battle-related deaths 
per year.61 This chapter explores strategic variables that create information asymmetries 
between a state, a military, and a population, and uses these variables to hypothesize 
where airstrikes increase or decrease political violence. In this way, the concept of 
information asymmetry is a uniquely positioned to connect both political extremism and 
political violence within a limited irregular conflict.  
Although statistical airstrike research has focused on policy coercion, campaign 
duration, civilian casualties, targeted killings, and drone ethics, few studies exist that 
measure violence in response to airstrikes.62 Even so, existing studies have developed 
                                                 
60 “Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on U.S. Airstrike in Somalia,” accessed 
November 1, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/788062/ 
statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-us-airstrike-in-somalia. 
61 Croicu and Sundberg, UCDP GED Codebook Version 2.0, 15. 
62 Pape, Bombing to Win; Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work? 
Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917–1999,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2001): 147–
73, doi: 10.1177/0022002701045002001 Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive 
Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 7, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0022002716652687; Susan 
Hannah Allen, “Time Bombs Estimating the Duration of Coercive Bombing Campaigns,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 112–33, doi: 10.1177/0022002706296153”; Brett King, 
“Coercive Airpower in the Precision Age: The Effects of Precision Guided Munitions on Air Campaign 
Duration” (PhD diss., University of Nebraska, 2014); Jeffrey Scott Bachman, “The Lawfulness of U.S. 
Targeted Killing Operations outside Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (November 
2, 2015): 899–918, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1072390; Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing 
the Mark,” International Security 38, no. 4 (April 1, 2014): 7–38, doi: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00157; Bradley Jay 
Strawser, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
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conflicting results in regards to increases or decreases in violence following airstrikes. 
Jason Lyall measures post-strike insurgent attacks in Afghanistan and suggests that 
airstrikes have resulted in net increases in violence against military targets.63 In contrast, 
Anoop Sarbahi and Patrick Johnston measure responses to drone strikes in Pakistan 
finding airstrikes have lowered both overall civilian attacks and attacks on tribal elders.64 
Therefore, research is necessary to resolve discrepancies between airstrikes and political 
violence studies to uncover whether the differences were due to variances in 
methodology or in campaigns.  
The current chapter aims to resolve the aforementioned statistical issues through 
variable spatiotemporal windows that measure the number of deaths from individual 
airstrikes and resultant political violence. Importantly, these measurements are conducted 
across campaigns from Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan from January 2002 to 
January 2016. However, prior to conducting statistical modeling, applicable literature 
within the four campaigns is assessed to denote similarities and differences in 
information asymmetry. Next, the statistical analysis is described in detail to include a 
new spatial-temporal measurement of airstrike density. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with hypothesis testing and an interim conclusion.  
A. THE STUDY OF KINETIC EVENTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
This research combines two geo-referenced datasets with a newly coded dataset 
of airstrikes that increases the locational accuracy and meta-data available for future 
studies. Building on previous studies, the New American Foundation airstrike dataset—
the same used by Johnston and Sarbahi—was used as a baseline to include an additional 
three years of data. This information was cross-referenced with a separate open-source 
airstrike dataset from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and is therefore well 
positioned to clarify the debate on airstrike effects in irregular warfare.  
                                                 
63 Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Coercion in Counterinsurgency Wars,” 2. 
64 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” 9–13. 
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1. Air Campaigns and Information Asymmetry in Irregular Warfare 
Historical air campaigns among Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are 
considerably distinct. Each campaign has differing levels of information asymmetry 
resulting from targeting strategies, as well as sate and insurgent capacities for narrative 
distribution. George Akerlof first conceived information asymmetry, an economic theory 
of decision making with incomplete information.65 Within this theory, rational investors 
choose between good or bad products companies based on available information from 
entrepreneurs.66 Entrepreneurs, for their part, must successfully pass their message to the 
investors amidst competition. Information asymmetry arises when entrepreneurs contain 
more information about the product than investors both for the protection of the 
entrepreneur and the product.  
a. Information Asymmetry and Airpower 
This thesis uses the theory of information asymmetry theory as a foundation to 
explore hypothesis regarding air campaigns. In particular, this chapter argues that a state 
using airpower holds more information than civilians do on the strategy or product of 
kinetic strikes. Withholding of information exists, at least in part, to protect a state from 
adverse insurgent actions that may reduce the destructive capacity of its military. For 
example, a state typically does not broadcast when an insurgent leader is being targeted 
for fear that the leader will take actions to inhibit the strike. Even so, in irregular warfare, 
civilians or investors are attempting to rationalize whether they see the product as good or 
bad based on the information available. As seen in Chapter II, airstrikes move bystanders 
to participants in the political process. Therefore, the state must balance its military’s 
desire for secrecy, and its population’s desire for information regarding the product. 
Insurgencies, must also balance their need for secrecy, due to aforementioned targeting 
concerns, with their own narrative regarding the airstrikes. In other words, the state and 
                                                 
65 George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” in 
Essential Readings in Economics, ed. Saul Estrin and Alan Marin (London: Macmillan Education UK, 
1995), 175–88, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-24002-9_9. 
66 Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu, “Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature,” Journal of Accounting & Economics 
31, no. 1–3 (September 2001): 403. 
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the insurgents construct competing narratives while seeking to maximize their ability to 
leverage power. 
Two important theories are drawn from merging information asymmetry and 
irregular warfare information operations. First, mounting evidence states that with 
effective vertical information, technologies experience a pacification of political 
violence. Camber Warren suggests that vertical information technologies, such as mass 
media, were effective in Africa to decrease collective violence.67 In contrast, horizontal 
communication technologies, such as social media, may increase collective violence.68 
This finding suggests that in areas where state passage of information to civilians is 
relatively widespread, state information asymmetry would be considered low and it 
would be possible to see a lower level of political violence in response to airstrikes. In 
areas where insurgent passage of information to civilians is widespread, insurgent 
information asymmetry would be low and increases in political violence may be seen.  
Second, information asymmetry when equal between the state and insurgency 
may increase the level of political violence. Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason 
Lyall suggest that insurgencies target areas of pro counter-insurgent support with 
violence to insert their own political agenda.69 If airstrikes are eliciting both government 
and insurgent extremes support after airstrikes, then insurgents could target this support. 
In contrast, areas that were usually strongholds of insurgents, when challenged by the 
state, would be subject to increased attention to hold onto a perceived information 
dominance by the insurgents.70 In either case, the perceived or real equivalence of 
information operations as measured by information asymmetry could hypothetically 
increase political violence. Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes that when information 
                                                 
67 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research, February 11, 2015, 00223433145581 
02, doi: 10.1177/0022343314558102, 24–30. 
68 Ibid., 20–21. 
69 Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, Civilian Attitudes and Insurgent Tactics in Civil War 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2016), 68, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=24461 
68. 
70 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2014), 341–34. 
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asymmetry for the state is low, and insurgent information asymmetry is high, it is likely 
to see a decrease in political violence. In contrast, when information asymmetry for the 
insurgency is low, and state information asymmetry is high, it is likely to see an increase 
in political violence.  
b. Air Campaigns in Yemen 
Yemen’s history with airpower has contained several variations of targeting 
strategies since the turn of the century. After Yemen’s first elected president created the 
fertile ground for corruption, two insurgencies grew in the country, a Shia-based Houthi 
insurgency called Ansar Allah, and a Sunni based AQAP. In 2013, following the Arab 
Spring, Ansar Allah began to move against the capital Aden. In 2014, backed by the 
Government of Iran, the Houthi rebellion captured Aden and massive swaths of 
Yemen.71 In response, a Gulf coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United 
States and the United Kingdom was formed to counter the Houthi rebellion and reinstate 
Yemeni president Mansure Hadi.72  
Airstrikes in Yemen have taken two interesting routes. First, the United States, 
since 2007 has been conducting counterterrorism strikes against al-Qaeda, with the aim 
of minimizing civilian casualties.73 In contrast, Houthi airpower initially targeted Yemini 
government vital centers. Soon after, Saudi-led airpower destroyed the Houthi air force 
began airstrikes to dominate the Houthi rebellion.74 Once the Gulf airpower team 
achieved air dominance, massive air campaigns followed a coercive airpower targeting 
strategy, attempting to limit the military objectives of the insurgents.75 However, massive 
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civilian casualties, which were received poorly by the population, resulted from this 
campaign.76 Once all overt military targets were hit, which included hospitals and other 
civilian sites that may hold rebels, the Houthi rebellion continued. Afterward, the Gulf 
airpower coalition decided to focus on defensive airpower in support of troops on the 
ground.77 The combination of several air campaign targeting strategies and a lack of 
information to the civilian populous on the rationale behind attacks and civilian casualties 
may have increased information asymmetry between military airstrikes and civilian 
understanding.  
In contrast to state militaries, AQAP and its affiliates have maintained a high level 
of information operations and have crafted successful narratives in response to military 
actions. This success showcases two important implications. First, AQAP focused on 
local-level exploitation, passing information along lines most available to local 
populations. Second, AQAP narratives not only crafted a believable story but also gave 
individuals an actionable plan to resolve the local-level grievances.78 Although the 
military had also looked to solve local-level grievances, airpower without information 
operations was seen by many as attacking the structure without understanding the 
cause.79  
c. Air Campaign in Somalia 
Somalia has long suffered insurgencies and political violence. In the 20th century, 
the lands of Somalia passed from the British to Italian hands to General Mohamed Siad 
Barre in the 1970s and 1980s. However, by 1991, civil war ousted Barre, and civil 
conflict grew to an extent that the UN and United States intervened in December 1992.80 
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Soon thereafter, the United States removed its troops in the region, bringing criticism on 
U.S. support to humanitarian operations as a viable option to decrease civil conflict.81 
However, the power vacuum resulted correlated to the attempted genocide of Rwandans 
and an even greater increase in civil-conflict.82 
Growing out of this power vacuum, an insurgent group named al-Shabaab—or the 
youth—took over thousands of square miles in Somalia.83 By 2007, United States aircraft 
began missions again, which destroyed training camps and provided surveillance and 
interdiction.84 In 2010, the President Barak Obama declared Somalia a national 
emergency, which is still active as of 2016.85 This declaration facilitated the commitment 
of SOF to build partner capacity, a small number of unilateral operations, and aircraft in 
support of both missions.86 
The air campaign in Somalia has three unique components. First, U.S. airstrikes 
were designed primarily to defend the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)’s 
troops, a regional solution to Somalia’s security issues.87 Aircraft supporting operations 
in Somalia focused on support to special operation trainers and advisors to defeat al 
Shabaab and establish a secure environment.88 Second, in addition to the airpower’s 
supporting defense of AMISOM troops, U.S. airpower has held a relative monopoly on 
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kinetic events from the air.89 This situation, in addition to lower civilian casualty rates, 
suggests that the information asymmetry for civilians understanding who and why 
airstrikes are conducted is much lower than in Yemen.90 Finally, President Obama has 
been highly vocal about airstrikes against al-Shabaab leaders, demonstrating a top-down 
information operations campaign.91  
d. Air Campaign in Afghanistan 
After 9/11, the United States entered Afghanistan with the goal to dismantle 
terrorist safe heavens and Taliban strongholds.92 Using airpower in this sense was in 
support of indigenous forces being supported by SOF, giving credence to the local 
campaign. However, by 2004, massive troops were placed in Afghanistan, switching the 
air campaign to a primarily defensive campaign in support of U.S. troop movements on 
the ground. It is notable that that Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was a counter-
terrorism campaign, whereas the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was 
designed to support NATO troops occupying Afghanistan.  
Importantly, in 2010 the DOD recognized the need to accomplish and support 
local level grievances, and undertook the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program.93 
Due to the lack of cultural unification in Afghanistan, special operations were focused on 
the lowest level of governance, namely the village.94 Although this program had heavy 
issues due to central government push back and Al-Qaeda or Taliban competing local 
level focus, the VSO program remained.95 
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In 2014, the prior OEF campaign was changed to Freedom Sentinel to continue 
the counter-terrorism strikes and attempt to dismantle al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.96 
However, the ISAF mission was exchanged for Operation Resolute Support, which more 
closely mirrored the original design of airpower in Afghanistan, namely supporting SOF 
missions of training, advising, and assisting indigenous forces.97 Importantly, in 
Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition airpower have had dominance in the battlespace, 
ensuring that when airstrikes do happen, the information asymmetry was low. Afghans in 
general understand that U.S. and coalition forces are conducting airstrikes; however, 
grievances still exist based on civilian casualties, such as the 2015 airstrikes on the 
Kunduz hospital.98  
e. Air Campaign in Pakistan  
The federally administered tribal areas (FATA) in Pakistan have long been a 
haven for tribes that resisted states and colonialism.99 Within a rugged and mountainous 
terrain, a reported 1.459 million individuals have been displaced by violent conflict 
within the region.100 U.S. actions in Pakistan have typically taken care not to involve 
boots on the ground, instead opting for a drone targeting strategy as President Obama 
noted to the National Defense University.101 However, beyond isolated drone strikes 
being conducted to dismantle al-Qaeda, not much exists to explain information operations 
that may or may not exist in the region. Even so, the Obama administration noted in 2016 
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that airstrikes in Pakistan and Yemen have had up to 116 civilian casualties.102 
Collectively then, the isolated drone strikes in Pakistan may have a high information 
asymmetry between the state dropping the munitions, in this case the United States, and 
the civilian populous. In contrast, insurgents have focused on local level support in the 
FATA region, allowing a much easier flow of information to the populous.103 
2. Hypotheses  
Table 1 shows the history of air campaigns among the different coalition and U.S. 
operations, as well as air campaign differences among Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Somalia. In Pakistan and Yemen, information dissymmetry between military 
operations and civilian understanding is high. According to open source reports, the 
targeting scheme in Pakistan has been purely offensive. However, it is unknown if U.S. 
or Pakistan airstrikes have included information operations. Therefore, a wide range of 
state information asymmetry—from high asymmetry to low asymmetry—is plausible. 
Even so, geographically, the FATA region is away from the established Pakistani 
government and has the potential to limit the reach of state information region within the 
area. In addition, at least three insurgent groups exist with fully functioning, and mature, 
information operations. This type of operation presents the possibility that within 
Pakistan, the information operations conducted by insurgents may outweigh any 
information operations conducted by the United States or Pakistan. 
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Table 1.   Air Campaign Differences among Yemen, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia 
 
 
In Yemen, the lack of a strong Yemini state has contributed to a high information 
asymmetry between airstrikes and civilians for several reasons. First, the presence of 
several competing air campaigns ensures that civilians much choose between 
understating an airstrike as a response to terrorist actions, or a Saudi-led intervention 
against an interim government. The ousted state of Yemini government must rely on 
outside agencies to provide information operations to its civilians regarding airstrikes. 
Unfortunately, the lack of precision munitions with Saudi-led airpower has led to an 
abundance of civilian casualties. These casualties are an important conversation starter 
for many civilians seeking answers; however, the state provides little to information. In 
contrast, the Iranian supported Ansar Allah and AQAP are adept at providing narratives 
in response to airstrikes. These combined observations suggest that the information 
dissymmetry is high between airstrikes and civilian understanding, leaving a gap for 
narrative distribution.  
Hypothesis 1: Campaigns experiencing a higher level of information asymmetry 
between civilians and military airstrikes—such as Yemen and Pakistan—will have a 
higher level of political violence following an airstrike.  
In contrast, Somali and Afghan information dissymmetry between military 
operations and civilian understanding is relatively low. In Afghanistan, it is due to years 
of NATO and U.S. unilateral actions that have turned the focus on local level grievances 
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and village support operations. Additionally, Afghan operations turned in 2014 to 
working with and through indigenous army and police forces, giving more credence to 
information operations. Detracting from this benefit, defensive airpower campaigns 
leverage kinetic strikes in defense of military troop movements. In these cases, 
government agencies are typically reactive, and as such, do not plan effective information 
campaigns. When facing unitary insurgencies, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, civilians 
within the area are left primarily to receive framing narratives from insurgencies rather 
than the state following a strike. Even so, it is possible that information operations 
conducted by U.S. and Afghan militaries at the lowest village level have decreased the 
information asymmetry between the state and civilian below that of the insurgency.  
In Somalia, a growing—as opposed to failed—state could theoretically manage 
the information space better. However, it is unknown if the multitude of supporting 
African nations increase or decrease information asymmetry. In addition, airstrikes are 
being conducted primarily, if not solely, by the United States in a primarily offensive 
nature. It is assumed, based on the capabilities of the United States Air Force that 
defensive airstrikes that have been conducted done with a critical eye to decrease civilian 
casualties and unnecessary destruction of property. This allows the state and executing 
agency to plan information operations in support of the network targeting. Although the 
insurgency is unitary, and able to provide more counter-narratives to airstrikes, this 
chapter hypothesizes that the state status, type of targeting, and air campaign status will 
result in a lower level of violence after an airstrike compared to Afghanistan and Yemen. 
Therefore, the following is hypothesized.  
Hypothesis 2: Campaigns experiencing a lower level of information asymmetry 
between civilians and military airstrikes—such as Afghanistan and Somalia—will have a 
lower level of political violence following an airstrike.  
B. STATISTICAL STRATEGY 
This chapter uses a spatiotemporal methodology for evaluating the effects of 
airstrikes on political violence. Spatiotemporal measurements were conducted from 2002 
to 2016 with measurements in Afghanistan being the primary deviation due to a lack of 
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data until 2015. This chapter analyzes the relationship between airstrikes and political 
violence not only across Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but also within 
them. Within each model, spatiotemporal disks prior to the airstrike are used to control 
for both current levels of political violence and classical determinants of violence, such as 
social status disparities, economic status disparities, geographic factors, and horizontal 
communication availability. Airstrike locations for Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan can be seen in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Airstrike density is 
signified in dark red with decreasing airstrike density in yellow and white. Yemeni 
airstrike locations in Figure 1 display a dispersal in central and western Yemen primarily. 
Somali airstrike locations in Figure 2 are primary on the southern and northeastern 
portion of the country. Pakistani airstrike locations in Figure 3 are concentrated on the 
western boarder of Pakistan in the FATA. Finally, Afghan airstrike locations in Figure 4 
are more uniformly dispersed in the eastern portion of the country. 
 
Figure 1.  Airstrike Density in Yemen from 2002 to 2016 
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Figure 2.  Airstrike Locations in Somalia from 2002 to 2016 
 
Figure 3.  Airstrike Locations in Pakistan 2002 to 2016 
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Figure 4.  Airstrike Locations in Afghanistan 2015 to 2016 
In the models reported below the unit of analysis is the individual geo-coded 
airstrike. Each airstrike is associated with a spatiotemporal disk that varies from 10 
kilometers to 50 kilometers, and assesses for previous levels of political violence and 
additional control variables. Importantly, these disks will vary in time based on the 
timeframe measured post-strike. In other words, spatiotemporal locations measured for 
control variables 30 days prior to a strike are assessed for their increases or decreases in 
political violence 30 days following the strike. Similarly, spatiotemporal locations 
measured 60, 90, and 120 days prior to a strike are measured for 60, 90, and 120 days, 
respectively following the strike.  
Airstrike measurements are obtained from the New American Foundation’s 
dataset on airstrikes combined with the International Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
dataset on airstrikes.104 Geocoding focused on using the available information from the 
datasets and then refining locations based on media reports. Individual geo-coding for 
104 “Covert Drone War Archives,” accessed September 25, 2016, https://www.thebureauinvestigates. 
com/category/projects/drones/. 
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airstrikes are refined as possible given the available media data. The centroid of towns is 
used as an initial starting point where amplifying information could more the geo-coded 
event in a specific direction. For example, if the airstrike were conducted against a 
vehicle that was on a specific road in a town, the geo-tagging would deviate from the 
centroid of the town to be offset to the road. Order of precedence for geo-coding was 
given to the centroid of towns. Offsets to roads or large geographic features were allowed 
based upon media reports. Geo-coding should be understood as information based on 
media reports, and not necessarily the precise location of an airstrike. Geo-coding also 
used latitudes and longitudes that provide bandwidths no smaller than one kilometer for a 
given geographic location.  
C. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
Statistical results in Table 2 show that after accounting for political violence in 
the 60 days prior to an airstrike, post-strike numbers are associated with an increase in 
political violence. The results are statistically significant at up to the 99% confidence 
level for 30, 60, 90, and 120 days following the airstrike event. These initial models 
suggest that airstrikes may have a baseline effect across campaigns of increasing 
subsequent political violence. This may point to the existence of fundamental 
mechanisms that span across all campaigns. For instance, it may be that airstrikes provide 
a political opportunity, which is susceptible to narrative distribution. However, to assess 
these trends truly, each campaign must be considered separately.  
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Table 2.   Overall Political Violence in Response to Airstrikes 
 
 
When considering political violence in response to airstrikes in Yemen, events 
were associated with increases in political violence within 30, 60, 90, and 120 days. The 
results in Table 3 show a four-fold substantive effect and are associated with p-values < 
0.01 for the aforementioned timeframes. 




Table 4 displays the political violence in response to airstrikes in Somalia. 
Interestingly, it appears that airstrikes are negatively associated with subsequent political 
violence. In other words, the more killed in action from an airstrike, the fewer political 
violence events observed at the 90, and 120-day mark at the 95% and 99% confidence 
level respectively with a substantive effect of a four-fold decrease. This is important for 
two reasons; first, this deviates substantially from the overall trends of political violence 
in response to airstrikes seen in Table 2. In other words, the evidence indicates that 
airstrikes do not have a uniform effect across campaigns. This suggests that more 
variables are at play that may have changed the perception of airstrikes in Somalia. 
Second, based on the lack of statistically significant results until after 60 days the effects 
of airstrikes can be seen as having long-term effects, which may not be initially visible. 
This suggests that correlations with information operations and sentiment may have the 
best explanatory power when viewed across longer time frames. 
Table 4.   Somali Political Violence in Response to Airstrikes 
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Table 5 displays the overall political violence association in response to airstrikes 
in Pakistan. Interestingly, the results display a positive association between total 
individuals killed by an airstrike and political violence at the 120-day mark and the 90% 
confidence level. These findings suggest a different response to airstrikes than were 
found in Sarbahi and Johnston, which may result for two reasons. First, airstrikes in this 
thesis were weighted dependent upon the number of individuals killed per event. This 
weighting could account for the differences in measurements. Second, this thesis includes 
three additional years of airstrikes not accounted for by Sarbahi and Johnston. In either 
case, the overall trend of airstrikes to increase political violence across campaigns and 
equal treatment of airstrikes across countries gives credence to new results.  
Table 5.   Overall Pakistani Political Violence in Response to Airstrikes 
 
 
The results shown in Table 6 display the effects of airstrikes on political violence 
in Afghanistan. Interestingly, the results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level, but unlike the other campaigns, the results differ depending on the spatial scale of 
the spatiotemporal disks used in the models. At the smallest scale, using disks with radii 
of 10 kilometers, airstrikes appear to be associated with increases in political violence. 
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These findings support the propositions by Lyall who also discovered an association 
between airstrikes and political violence.105 However, as seen in Table 7, using radii of 
approximately 50 kilometers, airstrikes are associated with decreases in political 
violence. There could be two reasons for this reversal; first, airstrike effects within 
Afghanistan could be limited due to the mountainous terrain and lack of horizontal 
communication across the country. In effect, this would limit narrative distribution about 
an airstrike that would increase post-strike violence via insurgents to a confined area. 
Second, counter narratives by U.S. and Afghani forces could have effects outside of local 
populations that could be significantly changed by competing narratives. This could also 
suggest that local level grievances in Afghanistan are more pronounced than in other 
countries. 
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Table 7.   Afghan Political Violence in Response to Airstrikes (50km) 
 
 
D. DISCUSSION AND INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical results presented here support the hypothesis that political violence 
tends to increase in Yemen and Pakistan in response to airstrikes. This implies that the 
Yemen and Pakistan campaigns are experiencing a higher level of information 
asymmetry between civilians and military airstrikes, leading to a higher level of political 
violence following an airstrike. As argued above, airstrikes are subject to information 
asymmetry, resulting in extreme interpretations of events. The findings provide 
robustness to the Hirose, Imai, and Lyall study that suggests sentiment can be a 
discriminator for political violence.106 
The results also suggest support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that campaigns 
experiencing a lower level of information asymmetry between civilians and military 
airstrikes—such as Afghanistan and Somalia—will produce a lower level of political 
violence following an airstrike. In Somalia, the information asymmetry between the state 
and insurgency clearly favors the state. In Afghanistan, the political violence is seen as 
increasing within a 10-kilometer radius and decreasing at a 50-kilometer radius. In this 
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case, this could be the result of competing information campaigns at the local level. 
Whereas insurgencies could leverage the effects of the airstrike in the immediate local 
area, villages outside of the immediate area are under a separate information asymmetry 
condition due to the VSO conducted by special operations. 
The models presented in this chapter give support for an overall violent response 
to airstrikes in limited irregular battles. This model gives credence that airstrikes have the 
potential to increase political violence, and as such, should be taken into account for 
policy concerns when conducting limited irregular warfare. It should be understood 
however that political violence is a tool commonly used when an insurgency is both 
fledgling and flailing, and as such, as a poor discriminator of success in limited irregular 
warfare.  
In addition to the overall violent response, the models in this chapter support prior 
academic studies in Afghanistan that associate political violence increases with airstrike 
locations. However, when used across campaigns, this chapter does not support prior 
academic studies in Pakistan. In this case, the differences in methodology between the 
Afghan and Pakistani studies are the most likely rational for the differences in results. 
Importantly, the study in Pakistan was bounded by region and could have been subject to 
modifiable areal unit issues, wherein the size of the boundaries erroneously impact the 
injects, and as such, the results.107 In contrast, the study in Afghanistan was not bounded 
by regions, and as such, are more accurate. The models in this thesis were also bounded 
by distance; however, several distances were measured to increase the robustness of the 
results. In this way, the study results reported in this thesis gain more credibility when 
comparing results from previous studies. 
Finally, the models presented in this chapter give credence for assessing the 
strategic impact of information asymmetry in limited irregular battles. Although 
exporting these results beyond the scope of the study cannot be directly supported, future 
models should look to correlate actual information operations with sentiment to 
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understand the granular assessment of information asymmetry. Even so, enough evidence 
exists to suggest that airstrikes do impact sentiment, and sentiment is modified by 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry, as a concept, can be used to generate 
the hypothesis on the ability of airstrikes to associate with higher or lower levels of 
political violence.  
40 
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III. AIRSTRIKES AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM
You don’t barrel bomb children! 
—John Kerry 
United Nations Syria Support Group, 28 Sep 2016 
To what extent—if any—do airstrikes affect civilian support of a state, an 
insurgency, or an external coalition? More specifically, do locations with higher 
incidences of airstrikes correlate with increases or decreases in popular support for 
political entities? This chapter uses geospatial measurements of popular support for 
terrorist groups and the Yemeni state from November 2013 to January 2014, combined 
with airstrike data from 2002 to 2014, to explore this issue. The results show that 
airstrikes are not simply associated with higher or lower support for a particular side in 
the conflict, but rather are associated with higher levels of political extremism on both 
sides of the conflict. 
Current quantitative research on airstrikes focuses exclusively on airpower 
attempts to coerce an insurgent organization to reduce terrorist acts or supporting 
activities.108 Airpower-related studies examine civilian victimization, targeted killings, 
drone ethics, and airpower coercion.109 These studies have left a significant gap in the 
assessment of associations between airstrikes and popular attitudes and perceptions.110 
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“Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Coercion in Counterinsurgency Wars”; Megan Smith 
and James Igoe Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence from Propaganda Output,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 2 (April 2013): 311–27, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2012.664011; 
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Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2011). 
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Duration of Coercive Bombing Campaigns,” 112–33; King, “Coercive Airpower in the Precision Age: The 
Effects of Precision Guided Munitions on Air Campaign Duration”; Bachman, “The Lawfulness of U.S. 
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Mark,” 7–38; Strawser, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military; Jai Galliott, 
Military Robots: Mapping the Moral Landscape (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2015). 
110 Sentiment in this case is the view or attitude of support for the state or non-state entity as 
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As U.S. foreign policy pivots away from large-scale land invasion strategies to a strategy 
of SOF and local partners on the ground augmented by airpower, understanding how 
kinetic events impact sentiment is invaluable for executing policy goals.111  
This chapter first retraces the history of the Republic of Yemen and ongoing 
insurgencies to apply context to existing civilian attitudes. Afterward, literature 
applicable to airpower and the potential diffusion of popular support will result in 
hypothesis development. Next, the data and analysis process, including the development 
of density grids using multi-bandwidth kernel density estimates, will be explained to 
showcase the explanatory power of the chosen models. Finally, this chapter concludes 
with findings and conclusions that support the overall study of airstrikes in irregular 
warfare.  
A. THE STUDY OF KINETIC EVENTS AND POPULAR SUPPORT 
This study compiles a new open-source dataset on airstrike locations by 
combining two existing geo-referenced databases. This chapter proceeds by first cross-
referencing accounts of airstrikes, and eliminating redundancies. Afterwards, those 
strikes that are unique to a particular database were tested for reporting veracity and 
endurance.112 Data measuring the spatial location of popular support is drawn from 
Global Research and Assessment Program (GRAP) for United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) J39. This data source makes it possible to associate the locations 
of airstrikes with the locations of patterns of political support in Yemen.113 
This association is assessed by first converting the airstrike data into a spatial grid 
(aka “raster”) by generating a smoothed estimate of the density of airstrike points over 
space. This density is then compared to the spatial patterns of support for various political 
entities in Yemen. The statistical analysis shows the following—seemingly conflicting—
111 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 6. 
112 Veracity was measured by reports that contained at least two reputable and external news stations. 
Endurance was measured by links that remain active as of July 2016.  
113 U.S. Special Operations Command (J39), Yemen Program Support, Research Report Wave #4 
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command (J39), 2014). 
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results. First, locations with higher densities of airstrikes resulted in higher levels of 
extreme support for al Qaeda, Ansar Allah, and violent extremism in Yemen. Second, 
locations with higher densities of airstrikes are associated with higher levels of extreme 
support for the government of Yemen. Third, locations with higher densities of airstrikes 
are associated with higher levels of extreme support for Western involvement. All 
findings pass multiple robustness checks and suggest that the effects of airstrikes are not 
simply associated with increases or decreases in support for a particular political entity. 
Instead, these findings support the idea that airstrike effects beyond immediate 
destruction are amoral effects. In other words, airstrike effects are not predisposed to 
causing negative sentiment for a standing state or government. Instead, airstrikes appear 
to move individuals from bystanders to participants in the political process, causing 
extreme support for both the state and insurgencies. In this way, airstrikes may be subject 
to civilian interpretation through narrative distribution. Said another way, political 
opportunities are available for exploitation by individual bias, social structure, and 
external accounts. Airstrikes as a political opportunity, allow opportunities beyond 
normal circumstances to mobilize populations through a particular narrative and exist as 
precursors to potential political violence.  
1. Yemen: A Brief History of Turmoil 
The Republic of Yemen is a country of embattled history and strategic 
importance. Yemen is surrounded by the Gulf of Aden to the south, Saudi Arabia to the 
north, and Oman to the east. In the 20th century, Yemen was divided into North and 
South Yemen, which existed as two states until 1990 when President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
was elected.114 Although President Saleh united the two countries, he became known for 
state-sanctioned corruption. Fraud was widespread and included withholding food and 
medical supplies from the population.115 In 1994, a Shia Houthi rebellion and a Sunni al-
Qaeda rebellion began in the northwest and south, spawning two civil wars that lasted 
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until 2012. After the Arab Spring in 2011, President Saleh was succeeded by President 
Hadi, who promptly lost the capital to the Houthi rebels and large portions of the south to 
Al-Qaeda in November 2014.116 After a coup d’état, Hadi was forced from the 
presidency succeeded by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. 
Historically, Yemen has been a hotbed for broad socio-economic grievances. 
During his tenure, President Saleh often used extra-judicial violence to quell popular 
uprisings and anti-government speech. The UN reported that 92% of women in Yemen 
suffered violence within their households.117 In addition, the World Economic Forum has 
reported the gender gap between men and women in Yemen as the last of 142 nations, 
with the fewest political and educational opportunities for women.118 Currently, Yemen 
has an unemployment rate of nearly 40%, which has elicited U.S. support of $1 billion 
since 2007.119 In addition, it has one of the fastest growing populations in the region at a 
rate of 2.9% growth annually.120  
Two primary insurgent groups have been vying for control of Yemen against the 
standing government, Shia Houthis and Sunni al-Qaeda. The Shia Houthis—sometimes 
called Ansar Allah—have been pressing their case in the northwestern corner of Yemen 
and slowly expanding toward southern Yemen.121 Believing in their lawful and historical 
governance of Yemen, Houthis are self-described descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad.122 From this perspective and building on civil-rights grievances, the Houthis 
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directly confronted the government of Yemen during the civil wars. Six on-and-off 
conflicts ended in a declared ceasefire in 2010 but were rekindled in 2012.123  
Opposing both the standing government and the Shia-based Houthis is Sunni-
based al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda broadly believes in violently countering Western influence and 
reviving an Islamic caliphate.124 Osama Bin Laden founded Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) 
in 2000 with an initial strategy focused on local-level support. This support used welfare 
programs and essential material provisions to build an insurgent base in disadvantaged 
locations.125 More specifically, AQY moved village to village in the southern Sunni-
dominated countryside, spreading leaflets, media, and personal contacts. This 
dissemination enabled small-scale mobilization of deeply entrenched local populations, 
eventually paving the way to flood the area with additional insurgents.  
In 2006, remnants of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia merged with AQY to avoid 
persecution, as well as improve branding and global perception.126 The merged group 
became known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and in 2009, began an 
effective propaganda campaign using jihad to counter local-level grievances.127 The 
reorganization allowed additional resources and flexibility that in turn facilitated growth. 
In fact, AQAP’s growth and stake in destabilizing the Yemeni government from peace 
talks with the Houthis was so troubling that it quickly developed into a UN Security 
Council discussion.128  
Between 2009 and 2010, AQAP attempted to build on popular sentiment and 
expand war-fighting capabilities to cripple the Government of Yemen in three ways. 
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First, AQAP focused on growing popular support locally and regionally under a narrative 
of grievances against the United States and its allies that intruded in Sunni Muslim 
affairs.129 Second, AQAP led several jailbreaks that freed inmates from Yemini 
government prisons in 2011, 2014, and 2015.130 Finally, AQAP launched Operation 
Hemorrhage, which conducted numerous small-scale attacks to incur cost over time to 
adversary governments.131 For example, Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab cost the United 
States an estimated $30 billion in additional security measures following the failed 
December 2009 underwear bombing.132  
By January 2011, the Arab Spring in Tunisia spread to Yemen.133 This revolt was 
exacerbated by almost half of Yemenis living in poverty and a lack of education and 
health care.134 Revolts grew after a heavy-handed response to insurgents, and in 2011, 
President Saleh and dozens of government officials resigned.135 Afterwards, President 
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s election was generally considered positive; however, AQAP 
and the Houthis continued to organize and leverage tribal groups against the government, 
eventually taking over the cities of Sanaa and Zinjibar.136 Ultimately, the Arab Spring in 
Yemen slowed a restart of public services and highlighted government weakness, which 
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facilitated both Sunni and Shia insurgencies to gain support that led to a coup d’état 
against President Hadi in 2014.  
2. Hypotheses  
The political history of Yemen has created a fertile ground to measure political 
support and opposition for both state and sub-state entities. Therefore, this thesis analyzes 
the relationship between airstrikes and resulting support for AQAP, Ansar Allah, The 
Government of Yemen, external states, and overall external extremism from 2012 
to 2014.  
a. State Legitimacy 
First, it may be that airstrikes increase positive sentiment and legitimacy of a 
state. For example, the United States has a long history of associating sentiment with 
state power. “Winning hearts and minds” is the theory that popular sentiment strengthens 
legitimacy in the state.137 In turn, a state viewed as legitimate gains compliance and 
support from the populous.138 This distinction is critical when the goal is not military 
conquest but influence of the local population. It is possible that in Yemen, airstrikes 
demonstrated a state’s ability to be undeterred from terrorist actions and to continue 
functioning despite violence. These airstrikes may have been effective when limiting 
collateral damage or resolving local level grievances with insurgents. In this way, belief 
in the legitimacy of the state could increase in locations with higher levels of airstrikes. 
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Growing literature also suggests state strength is a key deterrent of civil 
conflict.139 The greater the ability of the state to monopolize violence, the more a 
populous would feel free to provide information regarding the insurgents, believing the 
state could inhibit terrorist actions. State power is theoretically complementary, but 
necessarily separate from state legitimacy. For example, in Syria, the Assad and Putin 
regime airstrikes against civilians were meant to quell an insurgency by showing the 
overwhelming power of the state.140 Civilians may not view the state as legitimate, but 
may capitulate to the state for safety. Yemen airstrikes could have demonstrated a way to 
ensure freedom from intimidation for civilians, and as such, raise popular support.  
Hypothesis 1a: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience subsequent increases in support for the Yemeni state. 
Conversely, airstrikes may decrease support for the local state. This possibility 
can result for two reasons. First, in the event of civilian casualties, it may increase local 
level grievances against the state. In Yemen, it was seen most recently by the airstrikes 
on a town hall by Saudi Arabia, killing over 140 people.141 It is possible that these 
civilian casualties resulted in desires for revenge and decreased pro-state sentiment.142 
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Second, with a prolonged campaign, such as in Yemen, it is possible that the warfighting 
cost for the state would decrease the ability of the state to handle economic and 
humanitarian issues, thus decreasing popular support.143 The World Bank reports that 
nearly 21.1 million people in Yemen have been directly affected by the conflict, with 6.5 
million being displaced.144 The displaced citizens could cause further stress upon a 
country already living in 80% poverty, and as such, decrease state support.  
Hypothesis 1b: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience subsequent downturns in support for the Yemeni state. 
b. Insurgent Sentiment 
It is also possible that public support for insurgencies would grow in response to 
airstrikes. First, if the insurgents see an airstrike as the state extending its power in a 
given geographic area, insurgencies may focus on this area to control public sentiment 
and maintain their reputation.145 In Yemen, ex-President Saleh attempted to use an 
airstrike as a rallying call for civilians to attack Saudi Arabia.146 Casting a pro-insurgent 
narrative in these locations as a response to state power may use civilian casualty 
grievances—whether real or fabricated—to increase recruitment. Therefore, in Yemen, it 
is possible that the increased focus of information operations in these locations could 
result in a higher level of support for the insurgents. 
Second, insurgents may attempt to coerce the population using fear in a given 
geographic area, thus forcefully increasing insurgent support. In Yemen, al-Qaeda often 
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used this tactic to dissuade locals from supporting the state or Houthi rebels.147 
Theoretically, locations with higher levels of airstrikes would then be areas where the 
insurgents would be more likely to retaliate with terrorist attacks due to reputational 
concerns.148 In turn, this retaliation would deter disloyalty from the insurgent group 
increasing popular support. More specifically, civilians would then have a vested interest 
in pro-insurgent loyalty because it would decrease their susceptibility to attack.149  
Hypothesis 2a: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience increases in support for al-Qaeda and Ansar Allah. 
In contrast, air strikes may decrease support for insurgencies by showing the 
insurgency to be weak against the state in the following ways. (1) Leadership 
decapitation and a systemic network attack may lead to decreased recruiting and a 
reduction in the ability to operate in a cohesive manner; therefore, less public support for 
the insurgency. (2) A degradation of networks could cause a loss of skilled labor for the 
insurgencies, and as such, an inability to fulfill promises to the local population. A lack of 
promises could lead to a decrease in public support. In addition, if the area was suffering 
a suppression of support for the state, network targeting could theoretically free up 
civilians to decrease their support for insurgents.  
Hypothesis 2b: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience decreases in support for al-Qaeda and Ansar Allah. 
Finally, evidence suggests that insurgents are prolific at casting a narrative in 
response to military action, particularly those insurgents with access to mass media.150 In 
these cases, airstrikes would be manipulated to serve external extremist groups and 
decrease support for external states. The ability to build a global defensive narrative 
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against an adversary is a way to bridge social groups and build a social base. In this way, 
locations with higher levels of airstrikes could be associated with an increase in support 
for external extremism, but a decrease in support for external states.  
Hypothesis 3: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience decreases in support for external states. 
Hypothesis 4: All else equal, regions experiencing recent airstrikes are more 
likely to experience increases in support for external extremism.  
B. STATISTICAL STRATEGY 
This chapter utilizes 2D kernel density estimates to generate smoothed 
“heatmaps” as approximations of regions where higher and lower levels of airstrikes 
exist. Importantly, kernel density estimates allow for nonparametric statistics inferring 
density information based on bandwidths associated with a Gaussian distribution of 
variation in point locations. However, as is the case with airstrikes, there is a lack of data 
to suggest a consistent bandwidth selection. More specifically, it is not clear what 
assumptions should be made about the distances over which airstrike effects are likely to 
be observed, so it is not clear how much “smoothing” should be applied to the point 
locations. Standard bandwidth selection techniques—such as the mean integrated squared 
error—relies on a common distribution. However, it would be a mistake to assume a 
common distribution of airstrike effects, particularly in a military engagement, primarily 
because effects are likely to occur over multiple distances. Therefore, for each variable 
this thesis builds several rasters using varying bandwidths for the density estimates. 
These bandwidths have been selected at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 5 degrees of 
latitude and longitude to cover the range of possible airstrike effects. The independent 





Airstrike measurements were obtained from the newly compiled dataset described 
in Chapter II, which coded events from the New American Foundation’s dataset on 
airstrikes151 and the International Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Importantly, this 
data aggregates all airstrikes regardless of nationality dropping the munition. This is 
primarily due to a lack of confidence in the accuracy of information regarding the 
originator of the strike due to the open-source collection methods.  
Additionally, the models reported as follow include controls for economic status, 
population density, power relations, and prior levels of airstrikes. By controlling directly 
for economic status, it is possible to account for populations who may have harbored 
negative sentiment toward the state due to poverty. Power relations controls for 
populations that may have harbored negative sentiment toward the state due to a negative 
correlation with power disparities. Population density has been correlated with an 
increase in political violence; therefore, it must be accounted for to ensure the effects of 
airstrikes are measured in isolation. Finally, prior level of violence within an area, such as 
airstrikes must be accounted for; therefore, a control for the density of airstrikes over the 
previous five years is included.  
Figure 5 shows a visual summary of the GRAP Yemen data, with measurement 
locations given by blue dots. Figure 6 displays the estimated density of airstrike events in 
Yemen by displaying higher levels of airstrikes in deeper levels of red, whereas lower 
incidences are shown in yellow and then white. Airstrikes in Yemen showed higher 
density in the central and western portion of the country, whereas the eastern portion of 
the country displays a lower level of density.  
                                                 




Figure 5.  Yemen GRAP Locations November 2013–January 2014 
 
Figure 6.  Airstrikes in Yemen from January 2009–January 2014 
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C. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
This chapter uses a multivariate regression models to assess the relationship 
between airstrike density and popular support for various political entities in Yemen. 
Importantly, the dependent variable is reduced from a Likert-type scale giving four 
possibilities to a dichotomous measure indicating “extreme” support. Because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, I utilize logistic regressions to assess the effects. The 
results from these models are reported in Table 8. Ultimately, the regressions in Table 8 
show that differences in levels of support for political entities can be powerfully 
influenced by airstrike events. Figure 7 displays these results graphically, showing the 
effect of airstrike density on the expected levels of support for different political entities. 
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Figure 7.  Airstrikes and Sentiment Substantive Effect Measured in January 2014 
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Results shown in Table 8 display statistically significant positive relationships 
between airstrikes and support for both Sunni and Shia insurgencies in Yemen. In 
particular, AQAPs umbrella organization al-Sharia, shows large increases in support with 
a coefficient significant at the 99% confidence level. The Houthi insurgency, Ansar 
Allah, is additionally associated with a positive relationship between airstrikes and 
extreme support, which is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Furthermore, when assessing substantive effects, it can been seen in Figure 7 that support 
for Ansar al-Sharia is expected to increase by two-fold when shifting from the minimum 
to the maximum observed values of airstrike density. In contrast, support for the state of 
Yemen increases is expected to increase by only 10% under the same circumstance.  
However, in seemingly conflicting results, it also appears that airstrikes are 
associated with increased confidence in the national government, a finding that is also 
significant at the 99% confidence level. In addition, the results show positive associations 
between airstrikes and support for Western states, such as Germany, France, and the 
United States, again the case with 99% confidence. However, these results only appear to 
be conflicting if it is assumed that sentiment is a zero sum game. Instead, these finding 
suggest that as airstrike density increases, extreme support both for both sides can 
increase at the same time. 
To assess the robustness of these findings, Table 9 and Figure 8 show additional 
models with dependent variables defined by levels of support for further entities, 
including specific external states. Consistent with previous models, the findings indicate 
that airstrikes are associated with greater support for external extremism, at the 99% 
confidence level. Confidence in Yemeni government institutions is negatively associated 
within higher airstrike density locations again at a greater than 99% confidence level. In 
addition, support for external states, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, 
are negatively associated with areas of higher airstrike density measurements. Finally, 
support for the external state of Qatar is positively associated with higher levels of 
airstrike density at the 99% confidence level.  
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Figure 8.  Substantive Effects for Yemen, External States, and Extremism
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Two important conflicts arise from these models. First, the negative relationship 
between airstrikes and confidence in Yemeni governmental institutions stands in contrast 
to the positive relationship between airstrikes and support for the Yemeni state. This 
contrast suggests that airstrike density may highlight socio-economic grievances, such as 
a lack of belief in the ability of institutional apparatus to handle insurgencies. In addition, 
it also suggests that while airstrikes may pull from socio-economic grievances, a separate 
mechanism potentially exists that is taking the political opportunity of an airstrike and 
pulling civilians to extreme support for the state or insurgency. Narratives, or the ability 
to frame the political opportunity, are the most likely avenue of transitioning socio-
economic grievances through political opportunities. 
Second, differences arise between negative associations with support for the 
United Kingdom, and the United States and aforementioned positive associations with 
support for “western governments.” In this case, the negative coefficients for the United 
Kingdom and Iran suggest that Yemeni civilians have long-standing socio-economic 
grievances surrounding historical external intervention. As stated previously, these 
findings suggest that the political opportunity of airstrikes is not only subject to a given 
narrative, but also subject to prior social situations, such as historical resentment. 
Interestingly, sentiment for the United States is not associated positively or negatively 
with airstrike density at standard levels of statistical significance. 
C. DISCUSSION AND INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The results from the models reported above provide substantial support for 
Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that regions experiencing recent airstrikes would be more 
likely to experience subsequent increases in support for the Yemeni state. It should be 
noted, however, that the historical relevance of government corruption in Yemen suggest 
that regions experiencing airstrikes are additionally subject to uncovering dissatisfaction 
with government institutions. This suggests a broad mechanism of airstrike effects driven 
by transitioning populations from bystanders to participants in the political process.  
The findings in this chapter also supports Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that 
regions experiencing recent airstrikes would be more likely to experience increases in 
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support for al-Qaeda and Ansar Allah. Intriguingly, although each of the Yemeni 
insurgencies have shown positive associations, those insurgencies with higher local-level 
focuses—such as al-Sharia—appear able to generate greater increases in support in 
response to local airstrike events. This suggests that public support in Yemen may be best 
garnered by focusing on information operations at the local town level, even for a 
multinational insurgency, such as al-Qaeda. Finally, the data presented in this study 
suggests support for Hypothesis 4, which predicted that regions experiencing recent 
airstrikes would be more likely to experience increases in support for external extremism.  
In contrast to both grievance and power-based explanations, this evidence 
suggests that an information centric argument has the best power to explain the 
relationship between airstrikes and political support. Instead of assuming that airstrikes 
demand a particular response from civilians, it is more likely that airstrikes are subject to 
information distribution regarding their causes and effects. In this way, airstrike effects 
are amoral, not predetermined to either support or detract from sentiment for or against a 
state. Within Yemen, and elsewhere, it is likely that airstrikes are drawing upon prior 
socio-economic grievances and being utilized as a political opportunity using a narrative. 
This being said, within a given socio-economic landscape additional measurements are 
needed to assess how sentiment is mobilized into political violence. If the theory of 
information distribution using the political opportunity of an airstrike is accurate, the 
resultant political violence may exist in areas where information asymmetry, or the 
narrative, is not dominated by the state.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this thesis supports the theory that in irregular warfare, 
locations with higher airstrike density associate with measurable effects on civilian 
sentiment and political violence. The importance of these effects will deepen in 
consequence as the number of non-state actors and protracted wars increase.152 Two 
major findings emerge from this statistical analysis. First, airstrikes have a sentiment-
intensifying effect, which moves bystanders to become participants in the political 
process. Second, airstrike effects are dependent on socio-economic contexts and are, 
therefore, subject to variation in narrative distribution. These effects most closely align 
with the theory of information asymmetry.  
A. FIRST FINDING: AIRSTRIKES AS INTENSIFIERS OF EXTREMISM 
Airstrikes as measured in this thesis appear to have a systematically polarizing 
effect on civilian populations. These findings contrast revenge-based accounts that 
generally espouse airstrikes are responsible for negative civilian sentiment against state 
entities.153 Instead, these findings lend support to information-based accounts explaining 
civilian responses to airstrikes.154 By extending information-based theories to airstrikes, 
this thesis suggests kinetic events are amoral tools to create narratives and mobilize 
popular sentiment.155 Surprisingly, as opposed to supporting studies which show one 
sided effects of kinetic events and sentiment, this thesis shows airstrikes are associated 
with stronger support for all political entities within a given space. Subsequently, the 
                                                 
152 For more information on the logical consistency of using non-state actors in modern warfare, see 
Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–
2001,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 720–34, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478. 
2012.00759.x. 
153 Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, 32–34. 
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155 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expresses concern that civilian casualties being caused by 
airstrikes are playing into the hands of insurgents. He calls for a renewed look at how operations are 
conducted to ensure local level sentiment is accounted for in these situations. For more, see Heather Mayer, 




airstrike accelerated bystander-to-participant process, as shown in Chapter III, aligns 
more closely with radicalization theories that espouse a mixture of both ideology and 
social factors.156 Although this process can take place without airstrikes, the kinetic event 
itself hastens the bystander’s building of a conceptual framework to rationalize political 
violence. Figure 9 depicts the bystander-to-participant process wherein an airstrike gives 
the basis for narratives, bias, and social cues that transform into extreme support for a 
political entity.  
 
Figure 9.  Bystander to Participant Using Airstrikes as Political Opportunities.  
In addition to the increase in extremist sentiment, airstrikes also seem to draw on 
past social grievances to frame the political opportunity prior to narrative distribution. 
These findings help sharpen the debate on mobilization and sustainment theories, which 
fall generally into three camps. First, the classical theory of insurgent mobilization holds 
that disenfranchised individuals within society develop disruptive psychological states 
that drive participation in social movements.157 Social angst, as described with classical 
theory, may indeed result in individual dissonance; however, the positive views of the 
                                                 
156 Scott Helfstein, Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism 
(West Point: U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, 2012). 
157 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 7. 
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Yemeni government in areas with higher state violence suggest further mechanisms are at 
play.158 In contrast to classical mobilization, resource mobilization theory suggests 
insurgents are motivated by grievances related to a lack of access to political systems.159 
As stated previously, grievances are seen as a baseline for airstrike framing, but they 
cannot wholly explain the findings within this thesis. In particular, civilians displayed 
both a decrease in state institutional confidence, and an increase in extreme support for 
the state of Yemen. Therefore, the most likely theory that aligns with the data presented 
in this thesis is the political process model. The political process model advances the idea 
that socio-economic conditions form a basis for expanding political opportunities and 
drive social framing and recruitment.160 Inherent to this theory is the importance of core 
narratives that offer alignment and bridging between disparate social groups.161 Using 
this foundational idea, the models within this thesis indicate that within areas of higher 
airstrike density, narrative frame alignment, bridging, and extension possibilities 
increase. Therefore, it is most likely that airstrike effects as a political opportunity are 
available for state or insurgent mobilization.  
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B. SECOND FINDING: AIRSTRIKES AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY  
The statistical models presented here also support the proposition that airstrike 
effects are driven by forces similar to those seen in the economic theory of information 
asymmetry.162 In this way, airstrikes may be akin to making the product of state violence 
available to individuals with limited accessibility prior to the kinetic event. This theory 
extension has the following three implications.  
First, increasing information disclosure or decreasing information asymmetry may 
subsequently increase buy-in to the state’s political message upon the execution of 
violence. If rational actors do indeed choose between good and bad interpretations of 
airstrikes, increasing the information disclosure on a good product should theoretically 
increase the buy-in of that product. Often, this requires information “intermediaries” who 
are skilled at presenting information to the investor.163 For state actions, this is akin to 
military information support to operations (MISO) as experts in delivering information to 
the civilian population.  
Second, issues naturally arise with airstrike information disclosure, as not all 
airstrikes are effective in destroying only the intended target. George Akerlof describes 
this issue as the “lemon problem,” in which the product itself is never guaranteed 
completely beneficial.164 Therefore, not only do military airstrikes contend with 
manipulation by insurgent narratives; they also rely on the ability of those strikes to hit 
the intended target while avoiding civilian casualties. In addition, there is a tendency for 
entrepreneurs to overstate their causes either to make their products more believable or to 
retain investors.165 The loss of trust and anti-state sentiment could result if an investor 
uncovers false information from the entrepreneur. Therefore, MISO must ensure that 
honesty is involved when interpreting state violence for public consumption.  
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Finally, investment in a product allows an entrepreneur the ability to manage that 
investment to benefit the company. When civilians trust a state to use violence, or 
interpret violence by giving extreme support for the state, they are investing in the state. 
This is a critical component of controlling a population, as prior research suggests that 
civilian belief in the state monopoly of violence keeps revolutions at bay.166 Information 
disclosure would then suggest that civilians expect a portion of compensation for their 
political buy-in. For airstrikes, or follow-on military action, this could mean ensuring 
local-level issues are addressed as compensation for the individual’s belief in the state’s 
use of force. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It is important to note that the cases considered in this thesis focused on the 
secondary effects of airpower in limited irregular conflicts. These limited irregular 
airpower campaigns are fundamentally different from campaigns seeking the submission 
of a population through indiscriminant violence. Indiscriminant violence studies have 
shown that in circumstances such as the Russian artillery barrages in Grozny, domination 
over the civilian population may decrease political violence.167 However, short of 
overwhelming force, the human domain within irregular warfare allows for the 
exploitation of airstrikes through narratives and the mobilization of violence. As a 
process, the destruction of equipment—or militants—is only the first step in 
accomplishing policy goals. This destruction, in limited irregular warfare, is followed 
naturally by human interpretation, either acceptance or rejection, of the intended 
message. Although the human domain is not unique to limited irregular warfare, the basic 
premise of controlling a population elevates the interpretation of airstrikes to strategic 
importance. Moreover, the evidence seen here indicates that this “purchase” or rejection 
of the intended interpretation is dependent in large part on the level of information 
asymmetry available to the population or investor.  
                                                 
166 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 100. 
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Kinetic airstrike events not only have effects that span campaigns but also include 
effects specific to individual events. In limited irregular warfare, political violence and 
extreme sentiment are subject to human bias, socioeconomic grievances, and narratives. 
States must compete with insurgents for this information space in the same manner 
companies compete for potential investors. Because information dissemination 
techniques are readily accessible in today’s information age, the smaller the political 
entity, the faster the information may be disseminated. Therefore, government leaders 
must think deeply about their information dissemination techniques to lower the 
information asymmetry between the state and the population. As shown in this thesis, 
when using disseminating information, states should account for the sentiment-increasing 
effects of kinetic airstrikes.  
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